When complicated governance meets complex reality: epistemic breakdown in a safety-critical acquisition programme
Date
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Issue
Pages
Publisher
Type
Language
DOI
Abstract
Safety-critical programmes are typically governed by architectures designed for complicated problems, yet the systems they govern are frequently complex: their safety-relevant behaviours arise from interactions that generate emergent, unpredictable properties. This article examines what happens when such architectures encounter complexity, using the UK’s Ajax armoured vehicle programme as an extended case study. It traces four epistemic pathologies – decontextualised assurance, feedback suppression and the normalisation of deviance, narrative capture through the ecology of action, and contested truth criteria with the marginalisation of experiential knowledge – and introduces the concept of ‘evidence ecology’ as a bridging framework linking safety governance, assurance practice and programme management. The November 2025 recurrence of the same failure pattern demonstrates that the underlying epistemic architecture was not reformed by successive reviews and resets. The analysis derives design principles for complexity-informed epistemic governance transferable across sectors where assurance regimes confront socio-technical complexity.
Description
Citation
Rights
CC BY-NC
Funding
Editors
ORCID
Affiliations
References
Ale (2021). Living with legacy risk: the limits of practicalities?. Sustainability, 13(6), 3004. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13063004
Antonsen (2009).
Argyris (1978).
Baker (2007).
Dekker (2011).
Dekker (2012).
Dekker (2014). The bureaucratization of safety. Saf. Sci., 70, 348. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.07.015
Dekker (2011). The complexity of failure: implications of complexity theory for safety investigations. Saf. Sci., 49(6), 939. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2011.01.008
Fricker (2007).
George (2005).
Hackitt (2018).
Haddon-Cave (2009).
Hale (2013). Working to rule, or working safely? Part 1: a state of the art review. Saf. Sci., 55, 207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.05.011
Hansard, (2026). Westminster Hall debate. ‘ajax Programme’, 14.
HM Government (2025).
Hollnagel (2014).
(2006).
Hopkins (2012).
House of Commons Library, 2026. Future of the Ajax Programme. Debate Pack CDP-2026-0002. UK Parliament, London.
Hse (2001).
(2004).
Kelly (2004). The goal structuring notation: a safety argument notation.
Komljenovic (2016). Risks of extreme and rare events in Asset Management. Saf. Sci., 88, 129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.05.004
Le Coze (2019). How safety culture can make us think. Saf. Sci., 118, 221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.05.026
Le Coze (2022).
Leveson (2011).
Lundberg (2009). What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-find: the consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals. Saf. Sci., 47(10), 1297. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2009.01.004
Ministry of Defence (MoD) (2021).
Ministry of Defence (MoD), 2025. National Armaments Director to Drive Forward Defence Reform and Bolster National Arsenal [press release, 12 October 2025].
Morin (1992). From the concept of system to the paradigm of complexity. J. Soc. Evol. Syst., 15(4), 371. https://doi.org/10.1016/1061-7361(92)90024-8
Morin (2007). Restricted complexity, general complexity.
Morin (2008).
National Audit Office (NAO) (2022).
Perrow (1999).
Pidgeon (2000). Man-made disasters: why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Saf. Sci., 34(1–3), 15. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00004-7
Provan (2020). Safety II professionals: how resilience engineering can transform safety practice. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2019.106740
Rae (2014). Fixing the cracks in the crystal ball: a maturity model for quantitative risk assessment. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 125, 67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2013.09.008
Rasmussen (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Saf. Sci., 27(2–3), 183. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(97)00052-0
Reason (1997).
Sheldon (2023).
Snook (2000).
Stirling (2010). Keep it complex. Nature, 468(7327), 1029. https://doi.org/10.1038/4681029a
Sterman (2006). Learning from evidence in a complex world. Am. J. Public Health, 96(3), 505. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2005.066043
Turner (1978).
Vaughan (1996).
Vaughan (2005). System effects: on slippery slopes, repeating negative patterns, and learning from mistakes?.
Weick (2015).
Woods (2006). Essential characteristics of resilience.
Wynne (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: social identities and public uptake of science. Public Underst. Sci., 1(3), 281. https://doi.org/10.1088/0963-6625/1/3/004

