When complicated governance meets complex reality: epistemic breakdown in a safety-critical acquisition programme

dc.contributor.authorAscencio, Raul Leal
dc.contributor.otherRabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-05T12:01:46Z
dc.date.issued2026-05-29
dc.descriptionReferences: 49
dc.description.abstractSafety-critical programmes are typically governed by architectures designed for complicated problems, yet the systems they govern are frequently complex: their safety-relevant behaviours arise from interactions that generate emergent, unpredictable properties. This article examines what happens when such architectures encounter complexity, using the UK’s Ajax armoured vehicle programme as an extended case study. It traces four epistemic pathologies – decontextualised assurance, feedback suppression and the normalisation of deviance, narrative capture through the ecology of action, and contested truth criteria with the marginalisation of experiential knowledge – and introduces the concept of ‘evidence ecology’ as a bridging framework linking safety governance, assurance practice and programme management. The November 2025 recurrence of the same failure pattern demonstrates that the underlying epistemic architecture was not reformed by successive reviews and resets. The analysis derives design principles for complexity-informed epistemic governance transferable across sectors where assurance regimes confront socio-technical complexity.en
dc.description.urihttps://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0925753526001888
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ssci.2026.107297
dc.identifier.issn09257535
dc.identifier.issn18791042
dc.identifier.issn0925-7535
dc.identifier.otherScopus EID: 2-s2.0-105040121317
dc.identifier.otherScopus ID: 105040121317
dc.identifier.otherArticle number: 107297
dc.identifier.otherArticle number: 107297
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2026.107297
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarlyworks.ra.ac.ae/handle/123456789/2477
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier BV
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dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.rightsCC BY-NC
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.sourceSafety Science
dc.source.urihttps://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/105040121317
dc.subjectSafety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
dc.subjectOccupational Health and Safety Research
dc.subjectEthics and Social Impacts of AI
dc.subjectExperiential learning
dc.subjectCorporate governance
dc.titleWhen complicated governance meets complex reality: epistemic breakdown in a safety-critical acquisition programmeen
dc.typeArticle
oaire.citation.volume202

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